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NOTES
NLRB JURISDICTION OVER FOREIGN
GOVERNMENTS
I.

INTRODUCTION

In State Bank of India' the National Labor Relations Board 2
reversed its discretionary abstention policy and asserted jurisdiction over the American operations of a foreign government employer.3 Previously the Board had declined to assert jurisdiction
over these employers out of deference to foreign sovereigns, and
because of the Supreme Court's admonition against extraterritorial application of the National Labor Relations Act 4 in the absence of "an affirmative intention of the Congress clearly expressed." 5 The Board now believes that neither public policy nor
the policies of the NLRA can justify abstention.' Although the
Board has deemed the recently enacted Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 19767 (FSIA) inapplicable to its administrative proceedings, it nonetheless believes that the FSIA supports its decision to assert jurisdiction over foreign government employers doing
business within the United States. 8
This paper will analyze the Board's new approach in light of
both judicial developments under the NLRA and the Act's legislative history. The FSIA also bears examination to determine its
applicability to, and possible effect upon, Board determinations
involving foreign government employers. The appropriateness of
the Board's decision to assert jurisdiction must ultimately be determined in the context of the policies underlying the Board's earlier abstention, the policies now emphasized by the NLRB, and the
concerns of the Congress as reflected in its enactment of the FSIA.
1. 229 N.L.R.B. 838, 95 L.R.R.M. 1141 (1977).
2. Hereinafter NLRB or Board.
3. 229 N.L.R.B. at 842-43, 95 L.R.R.M. at 1147.
4. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1976) [hereinafter cited as NLRA or Act].
5. Benz v. Compafilia Naviera Hidalgo, 353 U.S. 138, 147 (1957).
6. 229 N.L.R.B. at 842, 95 L.R.R.M. at 1146.
7. Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332(a),
1391(f), 1602-11 (1976)) [hereinafter FSIA] [hereinafter references to the FSIA
will be to the sections of Title 28 of U.S.C. in which the Act is codified]. The
FSIA became effective on January 19, 1977, ninety days from the date it was
signed by the President.
8. State Bank of India, 229 N.L.R.B. at 842, 95 L.R.R.M. at 1146; SK Products Corp., 230 N.L.R.B. No. 186, 95 L.R.R.M. 1498, 1500 (1977).
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STATUTORY JURISDICTION

General Jurisdiction

In NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation9 the Supreme
Court held that the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution empowered Congress to regulate the labor relations of employers whose activities affected interstate commerce.' 0 Although
the Board's jurisdiction extends to all labor disputes affecting ininterstate commerce," this power' 2 has never been fully exercised.
The Board has exercised its discretion by declining to assert jurisdiction whenever, in its opinion, assertion of jurisdiction would not
effectuate the policies of the NLRA.' 3
Prior to 1959 the courts had occasionally rebuked the Board for
failing to assert jurisdiction, notwithstanding the language of section 10(a) of the Act that "empowered," but did not direct, the
Board to prevent unfair labor practices.' 4 Congress attempted to
9. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
10. The Court identified the foundation of jurisdiction as "[t]he fundamental principle . . . that the power to regulate commerce is the power to enact 'all
appropriate legislation' for its 'protection and advancement' . . . ." Id. at 36-37.

11. The Act defines the term "commerce" as "trade, traffic, commerce, transportation, or communication . . . between any foreign country and any State,

Territory, or the District of Columbia.,. . ." 29 U.S.C. § 152(6) (1976). The Act
defines the term "affecting commerce" as: "in commerce or burdening or obstructing commerce or the free flow of commerce, or having led or tending to lead
to a labor dispute burdening or obstructing commerce or the free flow of commerce." 29 U.S.C. § 152(7) (1976).
12. Section 10(a) of the Act empowers the Board "to prevent any person from
engaging in any unfair labor practice affecting commerce," 28 U.S.C. § 160(a)
(1976), and section 9 extends the jurisdiction to representation cases where commerce would be affected. Id. § 159.
A "labor dispute" is an indispensable prerequisite to NLRB jurisdiction. For
example, in NLRB v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 332 F.2d 992 (4th Cir.
1964), the court held that the Board lacked jurisdiction over a dispute involving
a union's refusal, pursuant to its policy of boycotting ships trading with Cuba, to
refer men to a United States employer for work in fitting a British ship in a United
States port. The court found that the dispute involved a political question, and
was not a labor dispute concerning "terms or conditions of employment." Id. at
996.
13. NLRB v. Denver Bldg. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675 (1951). The Board
and the courts have consistently adhered to the principle, expressed in a dissenting opinion in Guss v. Utah, 353 U.S. 1, 13 (1957), that: "The Board is not a court
whose jurisdiction over violations of private rights must be exercised. It is an
administrative agency whose function is to adjudicate public rights in a manner
that will effectuate the policies of the Act."
14. In Office Employees Local 11 v. NLRB, 353 U.S. 313, 318 (1957), the Court
held that "an arbitrary blanket exclusion of union employers as a class is beyond
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resolve the issue when it enacted section 14(c)(1) of the LandrumGriffith Act:
The Board, in its discretion, may, by rule of decision or by published
rules adopted pursuant to subchapter II of chapter 5 of title 5, decline to assert jurisdiction over any labor dispute involving any class
or category of employers, where, in the opinion of the Board, the
effect of such labor dispute on commerce is not sufficiently substan,
tial to warrant the exercise of its jurisdiction: Provided, That the
Board shall not decline to assert jurisdiction over any labor dispute
over which it would assert jurisdiction under the standards prevailing upon August 1, 1959.15

After 1959 it is still clear, then, that the NLRB has exclusive initial
power to decide its jurisdiction. 8 By enacting section 14(c)(1),
Congress sanctioned the Board's policy of nonassertion of jurisdiction as to an entire class or category of employers, 7 but prevented
the Board from narrowing its jurisdiction by refusing to assert
jurisdiction over those employers who were covered under the standards in effect on August 1, 1959. The Fifth Circuit has defined the
current standard in the following way: "The extent to which the
Board chooses to exercise its statutory jurisdiction is a matter of
administrative policy within the Board's discretion, and in the
absence of extraordinary circumstances whether jurisdiction
should be exercised is for the Board, not the courts, to determine."" The case law attests generally to the broad discretion
the power of the Board." Similarly, in Hotel Employees Local 255 v. Leedom, 358

U.S. 99, 99 (1958), the Court rebuked the Board for its "long standing policy not

to exercise jurisdiction over the hotel industry as a class." More recently, in
Eugene Good Samaritan Center, 191 N.L.R.B. 35, 77 L.R.R.M. 1412 (1971), in
adopting the opinion of its administrative law judge, the Board agreed that it
could not decline jurisdiction over an entire industry or class of employees.
15. 29 U.S.C. § 164(c)(1) (1976).
16. In Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. Schauffier, 303 U.S.
54 (1938), the Court rejected the theory that the Act was invalid because the
Federal Constitution does not empower Congress to vest in an administrative
body exclusive power to determine its own jurisdiction. The Court held that the
Act did not purport to leave determination of the question wholly to the Board,
but merely conferred on the Board exclusive initial power subject to judicial
review by the Circuit Courts of Appeals. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(a), (f) (1976);
Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41 (1938); NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Co., 301 U.S. 1, 47 (1937).
17. But see Eugene Good Samaritan Center, 191 N.L.R.B. 35, 77 L.R.R.M.
1412; see note 14 supra.
18. NLRB v. WGOK, 384 F.2d 500, 502 (5th Cir. 1967). It should be noted,
however, that the Board may not decline to assert jurisdiction by advisory opinion. Hirsch v. McCulloch, 303 F.2d 208 (D.C. Cir. 1962). But see NLRB v.
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enjoyed by the Board when it decides whether assertion of jurisdiction would effectuate the purposes and policies of the Act.19 The
FSIA, on the other hand, enumerates constitutional premises for
congressional intervention in matters affecting the United States
and another sovereign state."0
B. Affecting Commerce Requirement
Before the Board can assert jurisdiction over an employer's operations his activities must be found to "affect commerce," and the
employer must be "engaged in commerce" within the meaning of
has given
section 2(6) and (7) of the NLRA. 21 The Supreme Court
22
an expansive reading to these two coverage formulas.
In InternationalTrade Mart,n an early example of the Board's
philosophy that foreign commerce is encompassed within the Act's
definitions, the Board held that the nonprofit trade mart's operations affected commerce since the employer was organized to proWyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759 (1969).
19. See, e.g., NLRB v. Southwestern Colorado Contractors Ass'n, 379 F.2d
360, 362 (10th Cir. 1967); NLRB v. Harrah's Club, 362 F.2d 425, 427 (9th Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 915 (1967); Amalgamated Ass'n of Street, Electric
Ry. & Motor Coach Employees v. NLRB, 238 F.2d 38, 39-40 (D.C. Cir. 1956);
Pederson v. NLRB, 234 F.2d 417, 419 (2d Cir. 1956).
20. A look at the legislative history of the -FSIA reveals that constitutional
authority for enacting such legislation derives from:
the constitutional power of the Congress to prescribe the jurisdiction of
Federal courts (art. I, sec. 8, cl. 9; art. III, sec. 1); to define offenses against
the "Law of Nations" (art. I, sec. 8, cl. 10); to regulate commerce with
foreign nations (art. I, sec. 8, cl. 3); and "to make all Laws which shall be
necessary and proper for carrying into Execution ...

all ...

Powers vested

... in the Government of the United States," including the judicial power
of the United States over controversies between "a State, or the Citizens
thereof, and foreign States" (art. I, sec. 8, cl. 18; art. I, sec. 2, cl. 1).
H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1976); S. REP. No. 94-1310, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1976). Since the House and Senate Judiciary Committees
adopted identical reports, with different pagination, subsequent references will
be to the House Report [hereinafter CoMMrrE REPoRTS]. See generally Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 425 (1964); National Bank v.
Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356, 370-71 (1955) (Reed, J., dissenting).
21. 29 U.S.C. § 152(6), (7) (1976).
22. See, e.g., NLRB v. Reliance Fuel Oil Corp., 371 U.S. 224, 226 (1963),
where the Court stated that "Congress intended to and did vest in the Board the
fullest jurisdictionalbreadth constitutionally permissible under the Commerce
Clause." In its first Annual Report, the Board asserted that its jurisdiction was
coextensive with congressional power to legislate under the Commerce Clause, a
position which was upheld in NLRB v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601 (1939).
23. 87 N.L.R.B. 616, 25 L.R.R.M. 1152 (1949).
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mote international trade, and the promotional and sales activities
were a direct and important factor in the genesis of commercial
involving the shipment of goods in foregin comtransactions
24
merce.

In its subsequent West India Fruit & Steamship Co. decision,
the Board concluded that the provisions of the Act clearly indicated that foreign commerce affecting the United States is a domestic interest. The Board stated that: "The protection or regulation of such commerce involves. .. 'no attempt to act beyond the
territorial jurisdiction of the United States', though it may require
. . . giving a statute an extraterritorial impact if the statutory
policy is to be made effective.""6 Due to the wide support accorded
this view in subsequent decisions, 7 the Board's statement in
United Fruit Co.28 that the "affecting commerce" clause of the

NLRA should not be construed to encompass all commercial transactions touching or concerning the United States and other nationS29 is anomalous. In reaching its decision that the Act is concerned with American commerce and not that of foreign nations,
the Board observed that: "[A] foreign maritime operation can
retain its essentially foreign nature and remain the commerce of a
foreign nation outside the coverage of the Act despite underlying
United States interests and certain commercial contacts with this
country.

' 31

This observation was based upon the Board's

"balancing of contacts" approach to maritime jurisdictional questions.32 On appeal, the Supreme Court clarified its holding in Benz
24. Id. at 617, 25 L.R.R.M. at 1153.
25. 130 N.L.R.B. 343, 47 L.R.R.M. 1269 (1961).
26. Id. at 353, 47 L.R.R.M. at 1273 (footnotes omitted). The Board emphasized the language of the court in United States v. Timken Roller Bearing Co.,
83 F. Supp. 284, 309 (N.D. Ohio 1949), aff'd 341 U.S. 593 (1951), and stated:
"[A] general grant of power over foreign commerce, such as in the Labor Act, of
necessity includes the authority to reach prohibited acts even though occurring
in foreign territory when such acts have a direct effect on trade between the
United States and foreign countries." 130 N.L.R.B. at 351, 47 L.R.R.M. at 1272
(footnotes omitted); see Branch v. FTC, 141 F.2d 31, 35 (7th Cir. 1944).
27. See, e.g., NLRB v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 332 F.2d 992 (4th
Cir. 1964); Freeport Transport, Inc., 220 N.L.R.B. 833, 90 L.R.R.M. 1444 (1975).
28. 134 N.L.R.B. 287, 49 L.R.R.M. 1138 (1961).
29. Despite this language the Board nonetheless concluded that the employer's operations affected commerce, and the Board asserted jurisdiction. Id.
But see Dalzell Towing Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 427, 50 L.R.R.M. 1164 (1962) (where
the Board struck the balance the other way).
30. 134 N.L.R.B. at 288, 49 L.R.R.M. at 1139.
31. Id. at 288-89, 49 L.R.R.M. at 1140.
32. The comparison of a vessel's foreign and American contacts arose from the
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v. Compahia Naviera Hidalgo,3 3 by unequivocally rejecting the
"balancing of contacts" theory in determining the applicability of
the NLRA to foreign flag ships. 4 This reversal, based upon a rejection of the underlying basis for the Board's statement, casts considerable doubt upon its continued vitality.
Finally, it should be noted that the FSIA,3 ' if deemed applicable
to NLRB proceedings involving foreign government employers,"
may have an impact upon the "affecting commerce" requirement
of the NLRA. The FSIA leaves intact the present "affecting.commerce" standard as to the commercial activities of a foreign government within the United States,3" and acts which a foreign sovereign performs within the United States in connection with commercial activities elsewhere. The FSIA may, however, alter the
standards with respect to acts engaged in by a foreign government
outside the United States in connection with commercial activities
outside the United States, since it requires that such acts have a
39
"direct effect" in the United States.
C.

Employer Status

Statutory coverage under the NLRA extends only to the parties
defined in section 2 of the Act. Included therein is the Act's definition of an "employer":
Board's decision in Peninsular & Occidental S.S. Co., 120 N.L.R.B. 1097, 42
L.R.R.M. 1113 (1958).
33. 353 U.S. 138 (1957).
34. McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10,

18 (1962).
35. See note 7 supra.
36. See text at notes 108-144 infra.
37. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1976).
38. Id.
39. A "direct effect" under the FSIA's "commercial activity" exception may
not be the same as a "substantial economic effect" within the meaning of the
Commerce Clause. It has been suggested that the FSIA's use of the disjunctive
Igor" to separate the three clauses of section 1605(a)(2) and the conventional usage

of the term "direct effect" suggest that a much lower standard of association with
a United States forum would be required in order to subject a foreign government

employer to NLRB jurisdiction under the third clause. Note, Sovereign
Immunity, 18 HARV. INT'L L.J. 429, 437-40 (1977). The legislative history, however, suggests that the requirements for amenability to suit under this clause
should be no less stringent than the requirements under the other two. Hearings
on H.R. 11315 Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Law and Governmental
Relations of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., at 31
(1976); see
STATES

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED

§ 18 (1965). But see note 26 & text accompanying notes 25-31 supra.
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The term "employer" includes any person acting as an agent of an
employer, directly or indirectly, but shall not include the United
States or any wholly owned Government corporation . . . or any
10
State or political subdivision thereof ....

The question arises whether foreign governments are included in
the Act's enumerated exceptions to employer status. The responsibility rests with the Board to determine whether a relationship
between given parties is that of employer-employee within the
meaning of the Act.4'
Despite the absence of any clear legislative history on the subject,42 and a permissible interpretation to the contrary based upon
the wording of the Act, the Board continues to hold that foreign
government corporations do not fit within the "wholly owned Government corporation" exception. 3 Thus, the Board has consistently rejected the argument that foreign governments cannot
qualify as employers for purposes of the NLRA. Notwithstanding
this holding, however, the Board, prior to its recent policy reversal,44 had exercised its discretion under section 14(c)(1) 45 to refuse
to assert jurisdiction over foreign government employers doing
business within the United States."
D.

Legislative History of NLRA

The leading cases which have consulted the legislative history of
the Act to determine whether it applies to employers with foreign
contacts and interests have been maritime suits. In Benz v. CornpaiiiaNaviera Hidalgo,47 which involved damages resulting from
the picketing of a foreign ship operated entirely by foreign seamen
40. 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1976).
41. See, e.g., Greyhound Corp., 153 N.L.R.B. 1488, 59 L.R.R.M. 1665 (1965),
enforced, 368 F.2d 778 (5th Cir. 1966); Deaton Truck Lines, Inc., 143 N.L.R.B.
1372, 53 L.R.R.M. 1497 (1963); Mohican Trucking Co., 131 N.L.R.B. 1174, 48
L.R.R.M. 1213 (1961).
42. The dearth of legislative history on the subject may be due to the fact that
Congress never realized that foreign government corporations might one day be
made subject to the NLRA. See text at notes 47-48 infra.
43. SK Products Corp., 95 L.R.R.M. at 1498; State Bank of India, 229
N.L.R.B. at 840, 95 L.R.R.M. at 1144. The Board feels that such a construction
is consistent with canons of construction endorsed by the Supreme Court and with
the Court's holdings that the boundaries of the Act include "the workingmen of
our own country and its possessions." 95 L.R.R.M. at 1500.
44. See text at notes 190-221 infra.
45. 29 U.S.C. § 164(c)(1) (1976); see text at notes 9-20 supra.
46. See text at notes 162-89 infra.
47. 353 U.S. 138 (1957).
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under foreign articles while the vessel was temporarily in an American port, the Supreme Court stated:
Our study of the Act leaves us convinced that Congress did not
fashion it to resolve labor disputes between nationals of other countries operating ships under foreign laws. The whole background of
the Act is concerned with industrial strife between American employers and employees. In fact, no discussion in either House of
Congress has been called to our attention from the thousands of
pages of legislative history that indicates in the lease that Congress
intended the coverage of the Act to extend to circumstances such
as those posed here. It appears not to have even occurred to those
sponsoring the bill. The Report made to the House by its Committee
on Education and Labor and presented by the coauthor of the bill,
Chairman Hartley, stated that "the bill herewith reported has been
formulated as a bill of rights both for American workingmen and for
their employers." The Report declares further that because of the
inadequacies of legislation "the American workingman has been
deprived of his dignity as an individual," and that it is the purpose
of the bill to correct these inadequacies . . . . What was said inescapably describes the boundaries of the Act as including only the
workingmen of our own country and its possessions."
Because the dispute in Benz involved delicate questions of international relations, the Court felt that it would be inappropriate for
the NLRB to interfere, absent "the affirmative intention of the
Congress clearly expressed," supporting such interference. 9 Justice Clark, writing for the majority, concluded that only Congress
had the facilities necessary to make a fair determination on such
an important policy decision, where the possibility of international

discord was so great."
The Court reiterated its position in Benz in McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras,5 ' where it overturned an
NLRB-ordered representation election among the alien seamen of
foreign-registered vessels of an American corporation's whollyowned Honduran subsidiary. The Honduran-flag ships, operating
under time-charter to the parent, frequently called at American

ports." With respect to the NLRA's legislative history the Court
stated:
48. Id. at 143-44.
49. Id. at 147.

50. Id.
51.

372 U.S. 10 (1962). The case involved a Honduran labor organization

which, under Honduran law, was the exclusive bargaining agent for the maritime
employees. Id. at 11.
52. Id.
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We continue to believe that if the sponsors of the original Act or of
its amendments conceived of the application now sought by the
Board they failed to translate such thoughts into describing the
boundaries of the Act as including foreign-flag vessels manned by
alien crews.53
Despite the absence of any relevant legislative history,5 4 two
important rules of statutory construction do emerge from the maritime cases. First, as Mr. Chief Justice Marshall admonished in
The Charming Betsy,5 "an act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations, if any other possible construction remains ..

."I' Second, as the district court aptly stated in
".

its lower court decision in Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de
57
Honduras v. McCulloch:
An Act of Congress, no matter how universal the scope of its terms
may be, will ordinarily be confined in its operation and effect to the
the contrary intention
territorial limits of the United States, unless
8
is clearly and affirmatively expressed.
Under this standard the courts have been loath to enforce other
labor statutes when foreign employers are involved where there is
a lack of specific congressional intent." For example, in Sandberg
53. Id. at 20.
54. The few available remarks on the question of whether Congress in fact

exercised its constitutional power to apply the Act to employers with substantial
foreign contacts such as foreign-flag vessels in United States waters indicate that

only American workingmen were the concern of Congress. See H.R. REP. No. 245,
80th Cong., 1st Sess. 4, (remarks of Representative Hartley) reprinted in [1947]
U.S. CODE CONG. SERVICE 135; 75 CONG. REC. 5465 (1932) (remarks of Representative Dyer). -See also 22 C.F.R. § 81.12 (1977), which provides: "United States
citizens employed on foreign vessels ... have no claim ... to the special protection, in matters relating to their employment, which the laws of the United States
afford seamen employed on vessels of the United States."
55. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804).
56. Id. at 118.
57. 201 F. Supp. 82 (D.D.C. 1962).
58. Id. at 89; see Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 285 (1952); Foley
Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949); Jackson v. S.S. Archimedes, 275 U.S.
463, 466-67 (1928); West India Fruit & S.S. Co., 130 N.L.R.B. 343, 349, 47
L.R.R.M. 1269, 1271 (1961).
59. Most cases involve the four interrelated statutes known as the Seamen's
Wage Acts: 46 U.S.C. § 594 (1970) (seamen discharged without fault must be paid
one month's wages even if not yet earned); 46 U.S.C. § 596 (1970) (provision for

immediate payment of seamen after discharge of cargo or seamen); 46 U.S.C. §
597 (1970) (seamen entitled at every port to part of wages earned); 46 U.S.C. §
599 (1970) (wage advances to seamen unlawful). See also 8 U.S.C. § 1286 (1976)
(illegal to discharge alien seamen in the United States without the approval of
the Attorney General).

492

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

IVOL. 11.483

v. McDonald,'"the prohibition against making advance payment
of wages to foreign seamen was held inapplicable if the advances
were made outside the United States, especially where the law of
the foreign country sanctioned such contract and payment." The
old Eight Hour law governing employment when dealing with
government contracts was held inapplicable to work performed
in foreign countries,6" even though the statute referred to "every
contract" and apparently intended no exceptions." Finally, the
Jones Act, 4 governing the rights of seamen to recover damages
for personal injuries occurring in the course of employment, was
held inapplicable in Lauritzen v. Larsen" to a foreign seaman who
had been injured while in a foreign harbor.
The Supreme Court's interpretation of the legislative history of
the NLRA,the canons of construction developed in the maritime
cases, and the reluctance of the courts to give other labor statutes
an extraterritorial application, all support the Board's earlier policy of discretionary abstention from asserting jurisdiction over the
operations of foreign government employers.
III.
A.

FOREIGN CONTACT EXEMPTIONS

Activities Outside the United States

In Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines" the Board held that the policies of the NLRA would not be furthered by assertion of jurisdiction over unfair labor practices allegedly committed by a whollyowned Canadian subsidiary of Greyhound Bus Lines System, a
Delaware corporation. 7 Although the Canadian subsidiary was
subject to Interstate Commerce Commission rules and regulations
while operating within the United States, the fact that ninety percent of the routes were within Canadian boundaries subjected the
corporation to Canadian laws as well.68 In declining to assert juris60.
61.
62.
63.

248 U.S. 185 (1918).
Id. at 195. See also Jackson v. S.S. Archimedes, 275 U.S. 463 (1928).
Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281 (1949).
40 U.S.C. § 324 (1958), repealed by Pub. L. No. 87-581, 76 Stat. 360 (1962),

provided that:
Every contract made to which the United States. . . is a party. . . shall
contain a provision that no laborer or mechanic doing any part of the work
contemplated by the contract . . . shall be required or permitted to work
more than 8 hours in any one calendar day upon such work. ...
64. Merchant Marine (Jones) Act of 1920, § 33, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1970).
65, 345 U.S. 571 (1953).
66. 13 N.L.R.B. 28, 4 L.R.R.M. 268 (1939).
67. Id. at 32, 4 L.R.R.M. at 268.
68. Id. at 31, 4 L.R.R.M. at 268.
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diction, the Board stressed the potential conflict of laws that might
otherwise result.69 This concern appears to be particularly significant in transactions involving foreign government employers.
In Detroit & Canada Tunnel Corp.7 the NLRB held that employees who worked exclusively in Canada should be exluded from
the bargaining unit of a domestic vehicular tunnel and busline
company and its Canadian subsidiary. 7' In view of the integration
of the employer's total operations and the bargaining history, the
NLRB would ordinarily have found that all the employees, including those working exclusively in Canada, constituted a single
unit.72 The Board premised this exceptional result upon the gener-

ally accepted principle of international law that one government
is precluded from exercising administrative functions within the
territory of another government.73 Again, this rule seems to have
particular importance where foreign government employers are
involved, even when they operate within the United States, since
the employer's labor relations policies and decisions may be formulated outside the United States.
In Grain Elevator, Flour & Feed Mill Workers, Local 418 v.
NLRB, 74 the District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that the
NLRB had jurisdiction over the secondary boycott activities of an
American employer even though the primary dispute involved the
internal affairs of a Canadian employer and a Canadian union. '
Because the activity was characterized as occurring primarily
within and affecting the United States, 76 the decision is consistent
with earlier Board precedent.
Recent Board decisions have consistently declined to assert jurisdiction over American employees performing work outside the
United States. In RCA OMS, Inc., 77 the Board held that it had no
69. Under Canadian law the subsidiary was compelled to employ only Canadian citizens as drivers and could use only Canadian-owned buses. Id.
70. 83 N.L.R.B. 727, 24 L.R.R.M. 1141 (1949).
71. Id. at 731-32, 24 L.R.R.M. at 1142.
72. Id. at 731, 24 L.R.R.M. at 1142.
73. Id. at 732 & n.10, 24 L.R.R.M. at 1142. The Board also noted that the
exclusion of the employees working exclusively in Canada avoided any possible
conflict with the administration of the Industrial Relations and Disputes Investigations Act of the Dominion of Canada and the corresponding labor legislation
of the Province of Ontario. Id. at 732 & n.11, 24 L.R.R.M. at 1142. But see West
India Fruit & S.S. Co., 130 N.L.R.B. at 353 & n.30, 47 L.R.R.M. at 1273 & n.30.
74. 376 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
75. Id. at 776.
76. Id.
77. 202 N.L.R.B. 228, 82 L.R.R.M. 1531 (1973).
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statutory jurisdiction over an employer who, pursuant to a contract with the United States government, operated five Distant
Early Warning sites in Greenland.7 8 The employees whom the
union sought to represent were hired in the United States, paid
from the United States, and, upon completion of their jobs, returned to their original hiring locations in the United States."
Nevertheless, the Board found that since the unit sought to be
represented was located in Greenland, a Danish possession and
operated as a county of that country, the Board could not assert

jurisdiction. 0
Similarly, in GTE Automatic Electric Inc.,"1 the Board, in delineating a unit of telephone equipment installers, excluded those
employees working on projects in Iran and other foreign nations.
The Board held that the employees working outside the United

States were not within the jurisdiction of the Act. 2 In his concur-

rence, Member Jenkins drew a distinction between temporarily
and permanently assigned workers. He would not have excluded
78. Id. at 228, 82 L.R.R.M. at 1532.
79. Id. In a similar decision the Board refused to assert jurisdiction over a
company that hired commercial airline pilots, navigators, and flight engineers
and then subcontracted out their services to foreign airlines. International Air
Service Co., 216 N.L.R.B. 782, 88 L.R.R.M. 1337 (1975); see text at notes 176183 infra. Despite the fact that petitioner's unit would have included only flight
crews flying out of Anchorage, Alaska, jurisdiction was declined because the flight
personnel flew Japan Air Lines (JAL) planes, over JAL routes, on JAL schedules,
all under the direction and control of JAL personnel. Significantly, the Board
agreed that the employer was exempt from the Act as "intimately related to" an
agency of a foreign government and as a foreign-flag carrier. 216 N.L.R.B. at 784,
88 L.R.R.M. at 1339; see International In-Flight Catering Co., 209 N.L.R.B. 444,
85 L.R.R.M. 1364 (1974).
80. 202 N.L.R.B. at 228, 82 L.R.R.M. at 1532.
81. 226 N.L.R.B. 1222, 93 L.R.R.M. 1449 (1976).
82. Id. at 1223, 93 L.R.R.M. at 1449-50. Even if the Board has statutory
jurisdiction it may choose not to assert it because of other factors such as the lack
of local permanent residents, remoteness and difficulty of access. See, e.g., Facilities Management Corp., 202 N.L.R.B. 1144, 82 L.R.R.M. 1778 (1973) (the Board
declined to assert jurisdiction over maintenance employees working on a military
installation on Wake Island). But see Van Camp Sea Food Co., 212 N.L.R.B. 537,
86 L.R.R.M. 1573 (1974). In Van Camp, the Board reversed its earlier decision in
Star-Kist Samoa, Inc., 172 N.L.R.B. 1467, 68 L.R.R.M. 1532 (1968), and held that
it had statutory jurisdiction over representation and unfair labor practice proceedings arising in American Samoa, even though taking jurisdiction over that
island would require additional appropriations and create administrative difficulties.
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American employees on temporary assignment in foreign countries
from the bargaining unit."
The recent Board cases indicate a strong policy against asserting
jurisdiction over American employees performing work outside the
United States. The policy is founded upon a strong desire to have
only one sovereign dictating the labor laws governing the
employer-employee relationship, a concern which is particularly
great with respect to employees working for foreign governments
outside the United States. The need to have one sovereign determine labor conditions and standards also supports a policy of deference to foreign government employers doing business within the
United States, even where the employees are American citizens.
B.

Foreign National Employees

In Scott Paper Company84 the Board directed an election among
the Canadian employees of American lumber camps, holding that
the certain minimal standards in wages, housing, and transportation required before an employer could bring in Canadian employees under bond did not prohibit collective bargaining to raise the
standards or to encompass other terms and conditions of employment.85 Similarly, in Clare, C.P. & Co.,8" the NLRB held that it
had jurisdiction over proceedings resulting from union efforts to
represent warehouse employees working in Arizona, despite the
claim that the employees were foreign nationals employed by a
Mexican corporation.8 7 The Board found that in fact the employees
were employed within the United States under special work permits by the Mexican corporation's American parent company over
which the NLRB had jurisdiction.
83. Jenkins would include temporarily assigned workers in the unit because
they:
retain many interests in the conditions of employment in the United States.
There was testimony indicating they are on layoff status while on temporary
assignment and, in this respect, they clearly remain members of the bargaining unit. They are entitled to bargaining representation with respect to
such matters as the terms of their transfer to foreign countries, their retention of seniority rights, their rights to be returned to the United States, and
their reemployment rights. The fact that the employer need not bargain
about the terms and conditions of their employment in Iran hardly relieves
it of the duty to bargain about such other matters as those mentioned.
226 N.L.R.B. at 1223 n.2, 93 L.R.R.M. at 1450 n.2.
84. 171 N.L.R.B. 821, 68 L.R.R.M. 1164 (1968).
85. Id. at 823, 68 L.R.R.M. at 1166.
86. 191 N.L.R.B. 589, 77 L.R.R.M. 1535 (1971).
87. Id. at 590, 77 L.R.R.M. at 1536-37; see Great Northern Paper Co., 171
N.L.RB. 824, 68 L.R.R.M. 1167 (1968); Brown, Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 173 (1954).
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These decisions suggest that the Board is reluctant to relinquish
its statutory authority merely because a domestic corporation
employs foreign nationals 8 In fact, the Board has stated unequivocally that the Act "does not differentiate between citizens and
non-citizens," and in order to effectuate the purposes of the Act,
the Board feels that no such distinction should be drawn. 9 The few
instances where the Board has declined to assert jurisdiction because of the presence of foreign nationals as employees are arguably confined to their facts, since the cases have arisen in the Panama Canal Zone, an extremely delicate area of international concern." Thus, under Board precedent, the presence of foreign national employees should not bar assertion of jurisdiction over foreign government employers. Nonetheless, where the foreign nationals are citizens of the foreign sovereign employing them, their
natural loyalties and allegiance to the foreign sovereign could provide an obstacle to the Board's administration of the NLRA, which
would support a discretionary abstention by the NLRB.
C.

The Maritime Cases

The policy of deference to foreign sovereigns over labor relations
policies has evolved primarily in maritime decisions.9' As noted
above, moreover, these cases have been responsible for most of the
judicial inspection of the legislative history of the NLRA on the
issue of extraterritorial application. The central lesson that has
88. Italia Societa per Axioni di Navigazione, 118 N.L.R.B. 1113, 40 L.R.R.M.
1336 (1957), represents another instance where the Board has asserted jurisdiction
over the operations of a foreign corporation located within the United States
despite the presence of alien employees. See also Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 118 N.L.R.B. 1327, 40 L.R.R.M. 1367 (1957); Delta Match Corp., 102
N.L.R.B. 1400, 31 L.R.R.M. 1464 (1953).
89. Dan Logan, 55 N.L.R.B. 310, 315 n.12, 14 L.R.R.M. 20, 20 (1944); see West
India Fruit & S.S. Co., 130 N.L.R.B. at 361, 47 L.R.R.M. at 1276-77.
90. Contract Serv., Inc., 202 N.L.R.B. 862, 82 L.R.R.M. 1757 (1973). The
Board first found that it had statutory jurisdiction over an employer that employed Panamanian nationals and was engaged in bus transportation of United
States military dependents to and from school within the Panama Canal Zone.
In the exercise of its discretion, however, the Board declined to assert jurisdiction
due primarily to foreign policy considerations since such action might adversely
affect United States-Panamanian relations. Accord, United Fruit Co., 159
N.L.R.B. 135, 62 L.R.R.M. 1263 (1966); see SK Products Corp., 95 L.R.R.M.
1498, 1501 n.15 (1977).
91. See, e.g., McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros, 372 U.S. 10
(1962); Benz v. Compaflia Naviera Hidalgo, 353 U.S. 138 (1957); West India Fruit
& S.S. Co., 130 N.L.R.B. 343.
92. See text at notes 47-65 supra.
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emerged is that an "affirmative intention of the Congress clearly
expressed" must exist before the Court will sanction the exercise
of local American sovereignty in the field of international relations. 3 This standard should apply with full force to inclusion of
foreign government employers under the NLRA due to the general
absence of any guiding legislative intent."
9 5 the Supreme
In McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacionalde Marineros,
Court was faced with a potential conflict of laws of two sovereigns." Approval of Board jurisdiction would have displaced a
Honduran labor union which, under Honduran law, was the exclusive bargaining agent of the employees, with an American labor
organization. The Court emphasized that "[t]he possibility of
international discord" was a paramount consideration and could
not be dismissed lightly." McCulloch is thus strong authority for
general deference to9 8 foreign sovereigns in administrative matters
of internal concern.
The courts have likewise been very reluctant to approve of
NLRB jurisdiction when the only American connection to a maritime dispute is that it arose while the vessel was transiently in an
American port.9 There is concern that, if a nation exploited its
international maritime contacts to the limit of its power in order
to serve some immediate interest, "a multiplicity of conflicting
and overlapping burdens . . . would blight international carriage
by sea."' ° This warning applies with equal vigor to the operations
of foreign government employers.
D.

The FederalPreemptionAnalogy

The problems posed by the interaction of labor laws of the
United States and those of foreign nations are similar to the problems encountered under the federal preemption doctrine. The
93. McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros, 372 U.S. at 21-22 (quoting
Benz v. Compafiia Naviera Hidalgo, 353 U.S. at 147).
94. See note 42 supra. See also State Bank of India, 229 N.L.R.B. at 840, 95
L.R.R.M. at 1144-45.
95. 372 U.S. 10 (1962).
96. Id. at 19-21. The Court felt that enforcement of the Board order "would
inevitably lead to embarassment in foreign affairs and be entirely infeasible in
actual practice." Id. at 19.
97. Id. at 21.
98.

Id.

99. See, e.g., Benz v. Compaiiia Naviera Hidalgo, 353 U.S. 138, 146-47; Navios Corp. v. National Maritime Union, 359 F.2d 853 (3d Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 900 (1966).
100. Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 581 (1953).
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preemption cases are founded upon the principle that, due to the
essentially integrated character of labor relations, only one jurisdiction can effectively regulate the problems of union organization
and collective bargaining in a single unit. 0' The potential for conflict stemming from dual regulation of labor relations is even
greater when the conflict is between the laws of two sovereign
nations.102
Although the federal preemption doctrine may operate to disallow the states from imposing their own regulations on the labor
relations of foreign corporations, the maritime cases have tended
to permit state regulation.0 3 The inapplicability of federal legislation does not wholly negate federal preemption; the states may still
be precluded from regulating in this area by the paramount federal
power over foreign commerce'04 and foreign relations.'
The necessity for application of only one set of governmental
labor policies is equally strong whether the interaction is between
the United States and one of its States or between the United
States and a foreign sovereign.
IV.

FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT OF

1976

Congress enacted the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of
197616 in the hope that it would eliminate inconsistent determinations of sovereign immunity. 07 The FSIA seeks basically to remove
sovereign immunity as a bar to United States federal or state court
jurisdiction in suits against foreign governments engaged in commercial activities within the United States.' 8
101.

See, e.g., UMW v. Arkansas Flooring Co., 351 U.S. 62 (1956); Weber v.

Anheuser-Busch Inc., 348 U.S. 468 (1955); Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S.
485 (1953); La Crosse Tel. Corp. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 336
U.S. 18, 25 (1949) (dual regulation is "fraught with potential conflict").
102. See Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 581 (1953).
103. See, e.g., Incres S.S. Co. v. Maritime Workers, 372 U.S. 24 (1963); Marine Cooks & Stewards v. Panama S.S. Co., 362 U.S. 365 (1960); Benz v. Compaflia
Naviera Hidalgo, 353 U.S. 138.
104.

Cf. Pryce v. Swedish-American Lines, 30 F. Supp. 371 (S.D.N.Y. 1939)

(holding that construction of state civil rights law to apply to common carriers
engaged in foreign commerce would illegally interfere with foreign commerce);
but cf. Bob-Lo Excursion Co. v. Michigan, 333 U.S. 28 (1948) (holding that
application of state civil rights act to person engaged in foreign commerce did not
violate the Commerce Clause).
105. Cf. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942) (stating that state law
must yield to a treaty with which it is inconsistent).
106. See note 7 supra.
107. COMMrITEE REPORTS, supra note 20, at 7.
108. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330(a), 1602, 1605(a)(2) (1976).
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A. Applicability to NLRB Proceedings
The first question presented is whether the FSIA applies to
NLRB proceedings involving foreign government employers doing
business within the United States. Section 1602, which defines the
purposes of the FSIA, emphasizes the need for judicial determinations of questions concerning immunity. 0° Section 1330(a) translates this concern into a comprehensive jurisdictional scheme for
suits in American courts involving foreign sovereigns."10 The broad
scope intended by the Congress is reflected in the legislative history Which states that the FSIA "sets forth the sole and exclusive
standards to be used in resolving questions of sovereign immunity
raised by the foreign states before Federal and State courts in the
United States.""' Thus, the major focus of the FSIA is upon providing a consistent approach to, and resolution of, sovereign immunity questions arising in American court litigation."' Neither
the FSIA nor its legislative history mentions administrative agency
proceedings. The Board has seized upon this fact as evidence that
the FSIA is inapplicable to its adjudications." The principal ad109. Id. § 1602.
110. Id. § 1330(a). The legislative history states that the purpose of the FSIA
is "to provide when and how parties can maintain a lawsuit against a foreign state
or its entities in the courts of the United States and to provide when a foreign
state is entitled to sovereign immunity." CoMMITTE REPoRTs, supra note 20, at
6.
111. CoMmrrrEE REPORTS, supra note 20, at 12.
112. In addition to setting forth comprehensive rules governing sovereign
immunity, the FSIA establishes:
the jurisdiction of U.S. district courts in cases involving foreign states,
procedures for commencing a lawsuit against foreign states in both Federal
and State courts, and circumstances under which attachment and execution may be obtained against the property of foreign states to satisfy a
judgment against foreign states in both Federal and State courts.
Id.
113. In SK Products Corp., 230 N.L.R.B. No. 186, 95 L.R.R.M. 1498, 1500
(1977), the Board held that the FSIA did not require it to modify its established
policy of refraining from exercising jurisdiction over domestic firms vholly owned
or closely related to foreign governments or their instrumentalities. The Board
apparently approved of the employer's argument that enactment of the FSIA "is
limited to granting Federal and State courts jurisdiction over foreign states or
their instrumentalities in connection with 'a commercial activity carried on in the
United States by [a] foreign state,' and does not purport to extend or expand
the authority of administrative agencies." Id. Similarly, in State Bank of India,
229 N.L.R.B. 838, 95 L.R.R.M. 1141 (1977), the Board stated that:
While we recognize that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976
affects judicial, not administrative, determinations of rights growing out of
such activities, we believe that it is further support of our decision to treat
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vantage to this interpretation is that it avoids any conflict between
the vesting of original jurisdiction in the federal district courts to
determine questions of sovereign immunity"' and the NLRB's exclusive jurisdiction under the NLRA over unfair labor practice
17
charges"'5 and representation elections' involving employers'

whose activities affect commerce." 8

There are, however, compelling arguments for holding the FSIA
applicable to NLRB proceedings involving foreign government
employers. The legislative history provides strong indication that
the provisions of the FSIA were intended to cover labor disputes
involving foreign government employers. First, the legislative history states that the "employment or engagement of laborers, clerical staff or public relations or marketing agents" by a foreign government fits within the definition of "commercial activity" under
the FSIA."19 Second, as a type of situation that might be included
within the definition "an act performed in the United States in
connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere... ,",20 the legislative history sets out the following example: "the wrongful discharge in the United States of an employee
of the foreign state who has been employed in connection with a
commercial activity carried on in some third country." '' 2' The third
and most persuasive indication that the Congress intended the
foreign state enterprises coming within our jurisdiction as we would private
individuals under like circumstances.
Id. at 842, 95 L.R.R.M. at 1146.
114. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330(a), 1602 (1976).
115. Under section 10(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act, "the Board
is empowered ... to prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice .... This power shall not be affected by any other means of adjustment or

prevention that has been or may be established by agreement, law, or otherwise
..... " 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1976). "Prior to 1947, the section read: 'This power
shall be exclusive, and shall not be affected by any other means of adjustment."'
THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 441 (C. Morris ed. 1971). The Taft-Hartley amendments removed the words "shall be exclusive, and" and substituted in their place
a proviso empowering the Board to cede jurisdiction to a state or territorial agency
under certain conditions. Id. The NLRB thus "has exclusive and primary jurisdiction over the adjudication of unfair labor practices, except where it cedes jurisdiction as provided in section 10(a) or declines jurisdiction as provided in section
14(c). The Board has never concluded a cession agreement with a state agency."
Id.
116.

29 U.S.C. § 159(b)-(c)(1) (1976).

117.

See text at notes 40-46 supra.

118.
119.
120.
121.

See text at notes 21-46 supra.
COMMIrrEE REPORTS, supra note 20, at 16.
28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1976).
COMMITTEE REPORTS, supra note 20, at 19.
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FSIA to touch the foreign government employer-employee relationship is the following statement in the legislative history:
"public or governmental and not commercial in nature, would be
the employment of diplomatic, civil service, or military personnel,
but not the employment of American citizens or third country
nationals by the foreign state in the United States."1 2These three
examples suggest that Congress contemplated application of the
FSIA to labor controversies involving foreign government employers, resulting in the denial of sovereign immunity protection when
the employer is engaged in "commercial activities." 23
There are also practical reasons for finding that the FSIA applies
to NLRB proceedings. When a party seeks judicial review or enforcement of a Board order in the appropriate United States court
of appeals, 14 the issue of the applicability of the FSIA to foreign
government employers will surface again. 121 An argument can be
constructed that the FSIA is concerned only with matters originally cognizable in the federal or state courts and thus should not
be read to extend to appellate review of adminstrative agency actions.126 The appellate courts would be required to abdicate the
resolution of foreign sovereign immunity questions to the NLRB,
contravening the basic purpose of the FSIA: to transfer foreign
sovereign immunity determinations from the executive branch to
the judicial branch 27 by providing "the sole and exclusive standards to be used in resolving questions of sovereign immunity
raised by foreign states before Federal and State courts in the
United States." 121 Thus, it appears inescapable that, even if the
FSIA does not apply at the initial NLRB stage, it must apply when
the lawsuit reaches a United States court of appeals.
An arrangement under which the Board does not apply the FSIA
would require the circuit courts to make de novo determinations
of sovereign immunity questions involving foreign government
employers. Such a procedure would have serious drawbacks. A
122. Id. at 16.
123. See text accompanying notes 155-57 supra.
124. Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (1976).
125. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330(a), 1602 (1976); COMMiTrEE REPORTS, supra note
20, at 12.
126. See 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (1976); notes 110-12 & accompanying text supra.
127. See 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (1976). The Congress felt that such a transfer would
reduce the foreign policy implications of immunity determinations and would
assure litigants "that these often crucial decisions are made on purely legal
grounds and under procedures that insure due process." COMMTTE REPORTS,
supra note 20, at 7.
128. COMIrrTEE REPORTS, supra note 20, at 12.
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disgruntled litigant would be encouraged to disregard the Board
order or decision and to seek judicial review under section 10(f) of
the NLRA22 in the hope that resolution of the sovereign immunity
issue under the FSIA by the court of appeals might mandate an
opposite result. This would defeat the purposes and policies of the
NLRA to provide a speedy resolution of labor disputes 3 ' by further
delaying a final disposition of the controversy. Such an approach
would also increase the burden on the federal courts by encouraging further resort to these tribunals.
A bifurcated system would inhibit the development of Board
expertise in application of the FSIA. The NLRB's recent decisions
in State Bank of India'"' and SK Products Corp.,' 32 in which it
considered the possible outcome under the FSIA even though finding it to be inapplicable, attest to the Board's willingness and
ability to engage in such analysis. 33 Moreover, the Board has had
a wealth of experience in deciding closely analogous questions
under the political subdivision' 34 and United States government
employer' 35 exemptions of the NLRA. This is particularly true with
respect to differentiations between traditional governmental functions to which exemption attaches and private commercial activities for which there is no exemption.' 3 The development of Board
expertise in the application of the FSIA would discourage disrespect of Board orders by disgruntled litigants, since the courts of
129.
130.

29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (1976).
See generally 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976).

131.

229 N.L.R.B. 838, 95 L.R.R.M. 1141 (1977).

132.

230 N.L.R.B. No. 186, 95 L.R.R.M. 1498 (1977).

133.

SK Products Corp., 95 L.R.R.M. at 1500-01; State Bank of India, 229

N.L.R.B. at 842, 95 L.R.R.M. at 1146.
134. 29 U.S.C. § 152 (1976).
135. Id.
136. See, e.g., California Inspection Rating Bureau, 231 N.L.R.B. No. 75, 96
L.R.R.M. 1127 (1977), enforcing 225 N.L.R.B. 870, 93 L.R.R.M. 1192 (1976), in
which the Board rejected the employer's argument that merely because the func-

tion or service is mandated by state statutes it "per se" becomes intimately
connected with the state and is thereby exempted from NLRB jurisdiction.
Rather, the appropriate approach is an examination of all the factors including
the nature of the functions which have been mandated by the state to determine
whether the activities concern "traditional essential governmental functions as
distinguished from commercial operations." 96 L.R.R.M. at 1128.
The Board concluded that the insurance rating activities were similar to the
commercial operations of private sector enterprises and were not universally recognized, traditional governmental functions. Id. The Board's emphasis upon the
nature rather than the purpose of the activities is identical to the approach
adopted by the FSIA. See text at note 154 infra.
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appeals would probably be more inclined to defer to Board determinations concerning the FSIA.
Finally, it should be noted that state1 37 or federal court suits
brought under section 301 of the NLRA3 s to enforce collective
bargaining agreements" 9 would also raise foreign sovereign immunity questions which might give rise to the following anomalous
situation: The Board would find that the FSIA was inapplicable
to the representation campaign' and in the event of a victory by
the prospective bargaining representative, the latter would be certified.'41 After negotiation of a collective bargaining agreement, a

suit, such as to compel arbitration, might arise under section 301
of the NLRA. The state court or federal district court could conceivably conclude that the FSIA afforded the foreign government
employer sovereign immunity,' thus depriving the court of jurisdiction and leaving the bargaining agent remediless 4 3 The situation would be obviated were the Board to make a determination
under the FSIA at the outset to which the courts would be required
to give some deference.'"
137. In Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962), the Supreme
Court held that state courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the federal courts
over suits brought under section 301. The Court noted that under section 301 suits
"may" be brought in the federal district courts, not that they must be. Id. at 506.
According to the Court "nothing in the concept of our federal system prevents
state courts from enforcing rights created by federal law." Id. at 507.
138. Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act provides:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined
in this chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought
in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties,
without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1976).
139. The case law has securely established that the courts have jurisdiction
over suits involving collective bargaining agreements brought under section 301
even though the conduct may arguably be subject to the provisions of the NLRA.
Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962); Atkinson v. Sinclair Ref. Co.,
370 U.S. 238 (1962); Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962);
Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502.
140. As it did in SK Products Corp., 230 N.L.R.B. No. 186, 95 L.R.R.M. 1498
and State Bank of India, 229 N.L.R.B. 838, 95 L.R.R.M. 1141.
141. Under section 9(c)(1) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1) (1976).
142. Such a finding would be unlikely. See text at notes 145-49 infra.
143. If the foreign government employer were afforded sovereign immunity
protection it would be exempt from the provisions of the NLRA and could conduct
its labor relations policies without intervention by the United States Government.
144. Section 10(e) of the NLRA states that "[t]he findings of the Board with
respect to questions of fact, if supported by substantial evidence on the record
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Effect Upon Board Determinations
If the FSIA is deemed applicable to NLRB proceedings, the next
question becomes whether it affords foreign government employers
any sovereign immunity protection. The FSIA's exceptions discussed below appear to preclude sovereign immunity treatment in
the vast majority of instances. Only in the rare cases where none
of the exceptions applies would sovereign immunity attach.
B.

1. The Section 1332(c) Citizenship Exception
The FSIA defines a "foreign state" broadly as any political subdivision of a foreign state or any agency or instrumentality of a
foreign state.4 5 An "agency or instrumentality of a foreign state,"
in turn, includes any entity:
(1) which is a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise, and
(2) which is an organ of a foreign state or political subdivision
thereof, or a majority of whose shares or other ownership interest is
owned by a foreign state or political subdivision thereof, and
(3) which is neither a citizen of a State of the United States as
(d) of this title, nor created under the
defined in section 1332(c) and
46
laws of any third country.1

considered as a whole, shall be conclusive." 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1976). This

standard has been interpreted by the Supreme Court as requiring that agency
determinations of questions of fact be accorded strong deference. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488-90 (1951).
The courts are free to substitute their judgment for that of the Board on questions of law if it appears that the Board was in error in its interpretation of the

NLRA. NLRB v. Denver Bldg. and Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675 (1951);

NLRB v. Radio & Television Broadcast Engineers Union, 364 U.S. 573 (1961).
Nonetheless, due to the Board's special duty to administer the NLRA, courts
must give appropriate weight to the judgment of the Board as to the proper
interpretation. NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. 111 (1944); Medo Photo
Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 678 (1944).
Because Congress has primarily entrusted administration of the FSIA to the
federal and state courts the deference that would be due Board determinations is
an open question. See 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (1976). A standard similar to that
followed under the NLRA would provide the benefit of increased respect for
NLRB determinations. The Board's expertise in resolving issues similar to those
presented under the FSIA further supports application of the standard of deference traditionally accorded Board determinations of questions of law under the
NLRA. See note 136 supra.
145. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a) (1976).
146. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b) (1976). By becoming a stockholder in a corporation
licensed to do business in the United States the foreign state consents to the
corporation being treated under United States laws as a citizen of the state of
incorporation or principal place of business. See SK Products Corp., 95 L.R.R.M.
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By excluding entities which are citizens of the United States as
defined in 28 U.S.C. sections 1332(c) and (d),' 47 section 1603(b)(3)
of the FSIA carves out a major exception. The legislative history
cites as an example of section 1603(b)(3) entities a corporation
organized under the laws of the State of New York but owned by
a foreign state."' The rationale for this exclusion is that "if a foreign state acquires or establishes a company or other legal entity
in a foreign country, such entity is presumptively engaging in activities that are either commercial or private in nature."''
2.

The Commercial Activity Exception

The FSIA denies sovereign immunity to foreign governments
when they engage in commercial activity within the United States,
or perform an act within the United States in connection with a
commercial activity elsewhere, or engage in an act outside the
United States, in connection with a commercial activity outside
the United States, that causes a direct effect in the United
States.'50 The FSIA defines "commercial activity" as:
either a regular course of commercial conduct or a particular commercial transaction or act. The commercial character of an activity
shall be determined by reference to the nature of the course of conduct or particular transaction or act, rather than by reference to its
purpose. ''

The FSIA thus adopts a restrictive theory of sovereign immunat 1500-01. See also Schenley Distillers Corp. v. United States (ICC), 326 U.S.
432, 437 (1946); Amtorg Trading Corp. v. United States, 71 F.2d 524 (C.C.P.A.
1934). Where ownership is divided between a foreign state and private interests,
the entity will be deemed to be an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state
only if a majority of the ownership interests (shares of stock or otherwise) is owned
by a foreign state or by a foreign state's political subdivision. COMMITTEE REPORTS,
supra note 20, at 15; see Hannes v. Kingdom of Roumania Monopolies Inst., 260
App. Div. 189, 24 N.Y.S.2d 994, order resettled, 260 App. Div. 1058, 26 N.Y.S.2d
856 (1940); Sklaver, Sovereign Immunity in the United States: An Analysis of
S.566, 8 INT'L L. 408, 409 (1974).
147. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (1976) a corporation is "deemed a citizen of
any State by which it has been incorporated and of the State where it has its
principal place of business." 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (1976) defines the word "state"
to include the Territories, the District of Columbia, and the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico.
148. COMMITTEE REPORTS, supra note 20, at 15; see Amtorg Trading Corp. v.
United States, 71 F.2d 524.
149. COMMITTEE REPORTS, supra note 20, at 15.
150. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1976).
151. Id. § 1603(d).
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ity.52 Immunity exists when foreign states engage in public acts
(jure imperii), but not when they engage in commercial or private
acts (jure gestionis).' 53 The reference in section 1603(d) to the nature rather than the purpose of the activity may have the greatest
effect upon non-market economies in which nearly all trading activities might be considered to have a public purpose.'5"
As mentioned above, the legislative history of the FSIA provides
strong evidence of a congressional intent to include the labor relations of foreign government employers within the scope of the
FSIA.'15 Most employment controversies would be subsumed
within the "commercial activity" exception.' 6 Under the congressional scheme sovereign immunity would only attach to the employment of diplomatic, civil service, or military personnel.' 5
3.

The Waiver Doctrine

The FSIA states that a foreign state shall not be immune where

it has waived its immunity either explicitly or implicitly.," A foreign state can renounce its immunity explicitly by treaty' 9 or
waive the defense implicitly by agreeing to arbitration in another
country.' 0 An implicit waiver would also occur if a foreign state
filed a responsive pleading in an action without raising the defense

of sovereign immunity.' 6 '

152. First developed in a letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Advisor of
the Department of State, to Philip Perlman, Acting Attorney General (May 19,
1952), reprinted in 26 DEP'T STATE BULL. 984 (1952). The absolute theory of
sovereign immunity was stated in The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S.
(7 Cranch) 116 (1812), involving efforts by the creditors of a ship to attach it.
153. See COMMITTEE REPORTS, supra note 20, at 8. The gestionis-imperiidistinction was first recognized by an American court in Hannes v. Kingdom of
Roumania Monopolies Inst., 260 App. Div. 189, 24 N.Y.S.2d 994, orderresettled,
260 App. Div. 1058, 26 N.Y.S.2d 856 (1940).
154. Note, Sovereign Immunity, 18 HARv. INT'L L.J. 429, 438 (1977). See also
Fensterwald, Sovereign Immunity and Soviet State Trading,63 HARv. L. REv. 614
(1950); Timberg, Sovereign Immunity, State Trading, Socialism and SelfDeception, 56 Nw. U. L. REv. 109 (1961).
155. See text accompanying notes 119-23 supra.
156. Id.
157. COMMITTEE REPORTS, supra note 20, at 16.
158. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1) (1976).
159. COMMrrrEE REPORTS, supra note 20, at 18.
160. Id.
161. Id.
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V.

FOREIGN GOVERNMENT EMPLOYERS

A.

Board Precedent
In British Rail-International,Inc.,'12 the Board declined to assert
jurisdiction over an employer engaged in selling British railway
tickets and vouchers within the United States for rail travel in
Britain because of the employer's close relationship with the British Railways Board, an agency of the British government.'613 The
employer argued that the Board did not have jurisdiction, or, in
the alternative, should not assert jurisdiction, over a wholly-owned
subsidiary of a foreign government." 4 Without ever addressing the
question of whether it had statutory jurisdiction over the employer's operation, the Board exercised its discretion to dismiss the
union's representation petition. ' In declining to assert jurisdiction, the NLRB placed particular emphasis upon the employer's
close relationship with an agency of the British government.'66
In a later representation campaign involving the same union, '67
the Board again declined to assert jurisdiction' 8 because of the
close relationship between the employer, AGIP, USA, Inc., and
Ente Nationale Idrocarburi (ENI), an arm of the Italian government headed by a cabinet minister appointed by the Government
in power.' 9 AGIP's primary purpose was to assist in the purchase
of American equipment and materials for ENI's energy procurement and development projects.' In exercising its discretion not
to assert jurisdiction the NLRB again emphasized the employer's
162. 163 N.L.R.B. 721, 64 L.R.R.M. 1432 (1967).
163. Id. at 721, 64 L.R.R.M. at 1432.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 722, 64 L.R.R.M. at 1432. The Board did mention in passing that
although the day-to-day operations of the employer were administered by officials
in the United States, overall policy directives regarding labor relations and personnel policies emanated from London. Id.
166. Id. at 721-22, 64 L.R.R.M. at 1433. All of the employer's stock was owned
by the British Railways Board (BRB), an agency of the Ministry of Transport of
the United Kingdom. All of the employer's members of the Board of Directors
were appointed by the BRB. Of the three members residing in the United States,
none had managerial responsibility and all policy matters were transferred to the
three London directors for decision.
167. The Office & Professional Employees International Union, Local 153,
AFL-CIO.
168. AGIP, USA, Inc., 196 N.L.R.B. 1144, 80 L.R.R.M. 1245 (1972).
169. Id.
170. ENI was established for the purpose of producing energy from gas, oil,
coal and nuclear power for Italy's use. The world-wide ENI complex included
some 200 companies.
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close relationship with a foreign government.17 '
Member Fanning dissented in A GIP, USA, Inc. 7 2 He suggested
that British Rail could be distinguished on the ground that a substantial number of its employees were British nationals, whereas
A GIP involved only American employees. 73 Fanning relied in part
upon the presence of American employees in A GIP to bolster his
textual analysis of section 2(2) of the NLRA that "even assuming
the word "Government" used in Section 2(2) includes foreign governments, it is apparent that the Employer does not qualify for the
exemption given such employers.' ' 7 Fanning thus recognized an
exception to the Board's general rule of deference to foreign government employers and would have asserted jurisdiction whenever the
7
employees were primarily United States citizens. .
In InternationalAir Service Co., 7 a Board panel 77 declined to
assert jurisdiction, acting again upon the principle of deference to
foreign sovereigns. The Pilot Safety Association sought a unit comprised of International Air Service Company (IASCO) flight crews
contracted to Japan Air Lines (JAL) flying out of Anchorage,
Alaska. The Board held that assertion of jurisdiction would be
inappropriate because IASCO's services were intimately connected'78 with the exempted operations of JAL. 171 The nexus be171. 196 N.L.R.B. at 1144, 80 L.R.R.M. at 1245. The record indicated, in
effect, a parent-subsidiary relationship between ENI and the employer. ENI had
financial control over the employer's operations by virtue of its ownership of
approximately 97 percent of AGIP's corporate shares. ENI also exercised control
over the appointment of AGIP's corporate officers and directors. Testimony revealed that all labor relations policy for ENI companies, including AGIP, was
established in Italy.
172. Id. at 1145, 80 L.R.R.M. at 1246.
173. Id. at 1145 n.3, 80 L.R.R.M. at 1246 n.3. Both British Rail and A GIPwere
decided by three-member Board Panels. Fanning participated only in A GIP.
174. Id. at 1145, 80 L.R.R.M. at 1246; see text accompanying notes 40-46
supra.

175. As the question was not presented in AGIP Fanning did not need to
consider whether differing workforce compositions of alien and American employees would affect the outcome. Instead, Fanning repeated the remarks of Representative Hartley that the NLRA, as amended, was intended to be a "bill of rights
both for American workingmen and their employers." 196 N.L.R.B. at 1145, 80
L.RR.M. at 1246; see text accompanying notes 47-48 supra.
176. 216 N.L.R.B. 782, 88 L.R.R.M. 1337 (1975).
177. Member Fanning who dissented in AGIP again did not participate on the
Board Panel.
178. Under its contract with JAL, IASCO employed and maintained flight
personnel and assigned such personnel to JAL. JAL paid IASCO, the employer,
a basic fixed fee of a flat monthly payment plus a monthly unit charge. It was
the responsibility of IASCO to ensure that all assigned personnel remained quali-
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tween JAL and the Japanese government' was considerably
weaker than the "close 8relationship" emphasized by the Board in
British Rail and A GIP.'
InternationalAir goes much further than the NLRB's earlier
decisions in formulating a policy of discretionary abstention from
the United States operations of foreign governments and their instrumentalities. It is this strong policy of deference that the Board
chose to disregard in its subsequent decisions in State Bank of
India 82 and SK Products Corp. 8
Finally, the decisions arising from the labor disputes of employees of the World Bank bear upon the question of deference to
foreign sovereigns. After its initial assertion of jurisdiction was
rebuked by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia,"' the
Board held that as an international organization the World Bank
was not within its jurisdiction. 8 5 The court agreed with the Board's
emphasis 8 ' upon the bank's genesis in an agreement ratified by
many countries, its status as a specialized agency of the United
Nations, and the unique advantages enjoyed by the World Bank.,,7
In reliance upon these factors the court concluded that "the World
fled to perform the duties required by JAL. However, during the performance of
their duties, IASCO flight personnel assigned to JAL were under the supervision
and control of JAL even though their immediate supervision was by IASCO
personnel. 216 N.L.R.B. at 782-83, 88 L.R.R.M. 1337-39.
179. In an earlier decision the Board had decided that JAL was not an employer under the NLRA. International In-Flight Catering Co., 209 N.L.R.B. 444,
85 L.R.R.M. 1364 (1974). The Board did not need to decide whether JAL might
also be exempted from the coverage of the Act because of its status as a foreignflag air carrier. 216 N.L.R.B. at 784 n.8, 88 L.R.R.M. at 1339 n.8.
180. The only evidence of direct government control was the ownership of 50
percent of JAL's stock by the Japanese Government.
181. Compare Japan's 50 percent stock ownership of JAL with Britain's complete stock ownership of British Rail-Int'l and Italy's 97 percent ownership of
AGIP. In addition both Britain and Italy retained considerable control over the
appointment of directors and officers.
182. See text accompanying notes 190-208 infra.
183. See text accompanying notes 209-21 infra.
184. In Herbert Harvey, Inc., 159 N.L.R.B. 254, 62 L.R.R.M. 1253 (1966), the
Board asserted jurisdiction in a representation proceeding involving the maintenance employees in the building occupied by the World Bank. The Board found
that the Bank was notthe employer of the maintenance workers. This finding was
overruled by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. Herbert
Harvey, Inc. v. NLRB, 385 F.2d 684 (D.C. Cir. 1967). The case was remanded to
the Board for a determination of whether the Bank might be exempted from the
Act's provisions, thus barring the assertion of jurisdiction. Id. at 686.
185. Herbert Harvey, Inc., 171 N.L.R.B. 238, 68 L.R.R.M. 1053 (1968).
186. Herbert Harvey, Inc. v. NLRB, 424 F.2d 770, 773 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
187. Id.

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

/Vol. 11:483

Bank is an international organization which enjoys the privileges
and immunities from the laws of the sovereignty in which it is
located customarily extended to such organizations.'1 8 The World
Bank decisions stand as further support for a general Board policy
of deference to foreign sovereigns," 9 permitting them to pursue
their own labor relations policies while operating within the United
States.
B.

State Bank of India Decision

In State Bank of India'98 the NLRB expressly overruled its earlier holdings in British Rail-International,Inc.,'"t and A GIP, USA,
Inc., "2 asserting jurisdiction over the State Bank's Chicago branch
office."' Statutory jurisdiction was found to exist because the
bank's operations affected commerce and met the NLRB's jurisdictional standards for such enterprises.' 4 It was immaterial, ac188. Id. In reaching this holding the court placed strong emphasis upon the
Supreme Court's language in Benz, indicating that absent an express congressional mandate intervention in such a delicate field of international relations
would be inappropriate. See text accompanying notes 49-50 supra.
189. See also 28 U.S.C. § 1611 (1976); COMMrrrEE REPORTS, supra note 20, at
30.
190. 229 N.L.R.B. 838, 95 L.R.R.M. 1141 (1977). Over 92 percent of the State
Bank's stock was owned by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI), which in turn was
a wholly owned and controlled agency of the Indian government. Sixteen of the
State Bank's eighteen directors were either appointed by, or subject to approval
by, the Indian government. As an agent for RBI the State Bank performed numerous governmental functions, including the collection of taxes, holding of Central
government money, payment of government employees' checks, determination of
required bank reserves, and printing of bank notes which constituted legal tender.
The nexus between the State Bank and Indian government is at least as strong
as the "close relationship" emphasized by the Board in the earlier decisions where
it declined to assert jurisdiction. See notes 166 & 171, and text accompanying
notes 162-75 supra. In addition to the connections discussed above, the State
Bank was also strongly involved in assisting traditional Indian exports, the buying
and selling of foreign exchange, and other international monetary transactions
relating to international trade and investment.
191. 163 N.L.R.B. 721, 64 L.R.R.M. 1432 (1967); see text accompanying notes
162-66 supra.
192. 196 N.L.R.B. 1144, 80 L.R.R.M.1245 (1972); see text accompanying notes
167-75 supra.
193. The Chicago branch was licensed "to engage in a general banking business" by virtue of a certificate issued pursuant to the Foreign Banking Office Act
of 1973, 111. Rev. Stat. Ch. 16 112§ 501, et seq. The certificate permitted the Bank
to engage in a full spectrum of banking functions, subject to essentially the same
restrictions and requirements as Illinois-chartered domestic banks. 229 N.L.R.B.
at 839, 95 L.R.R.M. at 1143-44.
194. The stipulated facts were sufficient to warrant these findings. 229

Summner 19781

NLRB JURISDICTION

cording to the Board, that the State Bank was organized under the
laws of India, since the bank was authorized to engage in and was
engaged in, business operations within the United States. ' Thus,
the Board rejected the bank's argument that, as an instrumentality of a foreign government, it did not come within the definition
of an employer under the NLRA.1 1' The record indicated that the
branch manager had responsibility for the day-to-day operations
and personnel decisions, although overall policy decisions were
made by the central office in India. 9' Significantly, only two of the
eleven locally hired employees were Indian nationals. '
Perhaps the most intriguing aspect of the Board's decision is its
treatment of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. After finding
that the FSIA was confined to judicial proceedings and thus did
not affect the actions of administrative agencies, 9 ' the Board proceeded to examine the provisions of the FSIA in considerable detail.2°0 The Board concluded that the FSIA lent support to its deci-

sion to assert jurisdiction over foreign government employers. 20 '

N.L.R.B. at 840, 95 L.R.R.M. at 1144.
195. Id.; see Royal Bank of Canada (San Juan Branch), 67 N.L.R.B. 403, 17
L.R.R.M. 447 (1946). See also Delta Match Corp., 102 N.L.R.B. 1400, 1401 n.2,
31 L.R.R.M. 1464, 1464 (1953).
196. 229 N.L.R.B. at 840, 95 L.R.R.M. at 1144; see note 43 & text accompanying notes 40-46 supra. Under the Board's construction of the NLRA the burden
was upon the employer to demonstrate an affirmative intention of Congress to
exclude this type of employer from the Act's coverage. 229 N.L.R.B. at 840, 95
L.R.R.M. at 1144. The employer had argued that the burden was upon the petitioner union to demonstrate an affirmative intention of Congress to confer jurisdiction over foreign government instrumentalities. Id. The Board's treatment of
this issue provides an interesting comparison with the burden of proof scheme
outlined in the legislative history to the FSIA:
since sovereign immunity is an affirmative defense which must be specially
pleaded, the burden will remain on the foreign state to produce evidence
in support of its claim of immunity ....

Once the foreign state has pro-

duced such prima facie evidence of immunity, the burden of going forward
would shift to the plaintiff to produce evidence establishing that the foreign
state is not entitled to immunity. The ultimate burden of proving immunity
would rest with the foreign state.
COMMITTEE RFPORTS, supra note 20, at 17.

197. 229 N.L.R.B. at 839, 95 L.R.R.M. at 1143-44.
198. Id., 95 L.R.R.M. at 1144; see text accompanying notes 84-90 supra.
199. 229 N.L.R.B. at 842, 95 L.R.R.M. at 1146; but see text accompanying
notes 109-44 supra.
200. The Board's thorough and reasonable treatment of the FSIA suggests
that it would have no difficulty in developing expertise in application of the FSIA.
See 229 N.L.R.B. at 842, 95 L.R.R.M. at 1146; text accompanying notes 134-36
supra.
201. 229 N.L.R.B. at 842, 95 L.R.R.M. at 1146.
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Prior to State Bank of India the NLRB had developed a policy
of discretionary abstention with regard to foreign state enterprises
operating within the United States. 20 2 In reversing this policy and

asserting jurisdiction over the representation proceeding the Board
stated:
[Wie now conclude that there is no public policy or policy of the
Act which, on the ground that the employer is discolsed [sic] to be
an "agency" or "instrumentality" of a foreign state, justifies us to
continue to decline jurisdiction in cases affecting employees in our
own country whose employer engages in commercial activity which
meets the Board's jurisdictional standards for such enterprises. 20 3
State Bank of India thus originates a new Board policy of asserting
jurisdiction over foreign government employers.
The Board distinguished the Supreme Court's earlier decisions
in McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros2" and Benz v.
Compahia Naviera Hidalgo,2 1 holding that the cases were primarily concerned with the application of American labor laws to the
"internal management and affairs" of foreign flag vessels with foreign crews while the vessels were temporarily within American
territorial waters. 26 The Board also distinguished its decision in
Herbert Harvey, Inc., involving the World Bank.2 7 The Board

pointed out that as an international organization the World Bank
enjoyed a specific statutory grant of sovereign immunity. 2 8
C. SK Products CorporationDecision
In SK Products Corp.,29 decided soon after State Bank of India,
the NLRB again asserted jurisdiction over an instrumentality of a
foreign government. 201 The Board rejected the employer's argu-

ment that, since it was a wholly-owned, controlled and managed
subsidiary of a Yugoslav parent corporation,2 1 which in turn
202. See, e.g., AGIP, USA, Inc., 196 N.L.R.B. 1144, 80 L.R.R.M. 1245 (1972);
British Rail-Int'l Inc., 163 N.L.R.B. 721, 64 L.R.R.M. 1432 (1967).
203. 229 N.L.R.B. at 842, 95 L.R.R.M. at 1146.
204. 372 U.S. 10 (1962); see text accompanying notes 95-100 supra.
205. 353 U.S. 138 (1957); see text accompanying notes 47-50 supra.
206. 229 N.L.R.B. at 840-41, 95 L.R.R.M. at 1145.
207. 171 N.L.R.B. 238, 68 L.R.R.M. 1053 (1968); see note 184 & text accompanying notes 184-89 supra.
208. 229 N.L.R.B. at 841 n.14, 95 L.R.R.M. at 1145 n.14, where the Board
alluded to the International Organization Immunities Act, codified at 22 U.S.C.
§ 288 to 288f-2 & scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (1976).

209. 230 N.L.R.B. No. 186, 95 L.R.R.M. 1498 (1977).
210. Id. at 1502.
211.

SK Products Corp. imported, assembled, and distributed furniture com-
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formed an integral part of the Yugoslav government, 2 2 assertion
of jurisdiction over it would be inappropriate .2 3: In fact, the Board
concluded that, because the employer was an American corporation licensed to do business in several states of the United States,
SK Products Corp. presented an even stronger case for assertion
of jurisdiction over State Bank of India.2 4 The record indicated
that overall policy decisions were made in Yugoslavia, but that
the president of the American corporation had "final domestic
authority" over the employer's operations.2 1 ' The record was
silent about the nationality of the nonsupervisory2 employees at
the plant involved in the representation campaign. 11
The Board again reached the conclusion that section 2(2) of the
NLRA, exempting "wholly owned Government corporations," does
not include foreign state enterprises, 2"7 and the FSIA was once
more deemed inapplicable to NLRB proceedings. 218 Nonetheless,
in another detailed analysis of the FSIA, the Board concluded that
the recent enactment supported its reversal of policy as to foreign
government employers.2 ' Ultimately, the Board premised its assertion of jurisdiction upon the need to treat all employees within
the United States similarly, which could be accomplished only
through elimination of the "islands of immunity" that had preponents produced by the parent corporation, Slovenijales, Yugoslavia's second
largest producer of wood products.
212. Slovenijales is Yugoslavia's leading exporter of commodities manufactured in one of the country's most important industries. Of the eight members of
SK Products Corporation's board of directors, six were Yugoslav nationals and
the remaining two were United States citizens. SK Products Corporation was
wholly owned by Slovenijales, which in turn was "socially owned" by the workers
for the benefit of the state. 95 L.R.R.M. at 1499.
213. Id. at 1500.
214. Id. at 1500-01. The representation campaign involved the employer's
Alsip, Illinois facility where SK Products Corporation was licensed to transact
business pursuant to a certificate issued under "The Business Corporation Act"
of Illinois in force July 13, 1933. SK Products Corp. was incorporated under the
laws of the State of New Jersey. 95 L.R.R.M. at 1500 n.7.
215. 95 L.R.R.M. at 1499-1500.
216. Id. at 1500. On a national scale approximately 30 percent of the corporation's nonsupervisory employees were Yugoslav nationals, with the remaining 70
percent presumably being United States citizens. The Board cited to its earlier
decisions in Dan Logan, 55 N.L.R.B. 310, 315, 14 L.R.R.M. 20, 20 (1944), and
Clare, C.P. & Co., 191 N.L.R.B. 589, 77 L.R.R.M. 1535 (1971), as support for the
proposition that the NLRA does not differentiate between citizens and noncitizens. 95 L.R.R.M. at 1500 n.8; see note 88 & text accompanying notes 84-90 supra.
217. 95 L.R.R.M. at 1500; see note 196 supra.
218. 95 L.R.R.M. at 1500.
219. Id. at 1500-01.
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viously existed.2" The Board felt that its exercise of national sovereignty was consonant with generally accepted principles of international law.'
VI.

CONCLUSION

Until its decisions in State Bank of India and SKProductsCorp.
the NLRB had declined to assert jurisdiction over foreign government employers. The Board's policy of abstention was based on the
need to have only one sovereign administering the employeremployee relationship, the desire to avoid international discord,
the Supreme Court's caution against giving the NLRA extraterritorial application in the absence of an "affirmative intention of the
Congress clearly expressed," and the desire to avoid conflicts between the laws of two sovereign states. Despite the Board's conclusion that neither public policy nor the policies of the NLRA continue to justify abstention, the factors discussed above are still
important, especially when the NLRA is applied to employees who
are citizens of the foreign government for whom they work. Thus,
the NLRB's new policy of asserting jurisdiction over foreign government employers will not be achieved without costs. International discord, potential conflicts of law, and administrative difficulty in applying the NLRA to employees who are citizens of the
foreign government for whom they work, are harms which could
result from the new policy.
The Board has also concluded that its proceedings are unaffected by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976. The legislative history of the FSIA, as has been pointed out above, however,
contains several examples of how a foreign government's employment practices in the United States may constitute "commercial
activity" under the provisions of the FSIA. This legislative history
clearly indicates that Congress intended the FSIA to apply to the
labor relations practices of foreign governments doing business in
the United States and to any proceedings that might stem from the
employment practices. Application of the FSIA to Board proceedings would ensure more uniform resolution of sovereign immunity
questions, would increase administrative and judicial economy,
and would further effectuate the policies of the NLRA by providing
a speedier resolution of labor disputes.
Dan T. Carter
220. Id. at 1501.
221. Id.

